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THE WORD AND WORDS* 
  
ENCOUNTERING GOD IN LANGUAGE 
C. David Baker† 
 
ABSTRACT: Language, per se, bears revelatory witness to the nature of God and, in 
consequence, important insight into the structure of the cosmos. However, theological scholarship 
rarely engages language as a revelatory category, instead limiting its attention to the behavior of 
sacred words. This is unfortunate, for a deeper engagement with the essence of language offers 
fruitful possibilities that include encountering the triune God as a linguistic community, and the 
implications of all things existing within God-speech. What follows probes the soul of language, 
positing the claim that who God is, language does. 
 
Introduction. 
“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.” 
John 1:1. 
In the essay to follow I will assert that a deeper understanding of how language works 
offers fresh insights into the character of God. It is my hope that, thus informed, post-modern 
Christian communities might find unity in bearing witness to an inviting God who shares of 
himself poetically. 1  
As the Word God spoke the Creation into being, and with words he blessed it. He continues 
to converse with humans made in the Imago Dei, persons to whom he imparts those reflective, 
communicative, and imaginative processes of semiotic thought and speech mysteriously 
concomitant with his own nature. In so doing, God has chosen to reveal himself via language—
broadly defined for this essay as semiotic discourse, that is, communication through a full spectrum 
of images (including words), sounds, and gestures.2 
 
* © 2020 David Baker 
† MLitt 2008, University of St Andrews 
1 I use the term intentionally and according to Ricoeur’s use of poetics as a work governing its own reading. See Paul 
Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, vol. III (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), 159. 
2 Daniel Chandler, “Semiotics for Beginners,” https://www.cs.princeton.edu/~chazelle/courses/BIB/semio2.htm.  
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Interest in the power of language theory has risen remarkably since Friedrich Nietzsche’s 
observation that language is somehow involved with the process of knowing.3 Ricoeur, Austin, 
Searle and others have since contributed much. Given the self-identity of Christian communities 
as textual communities it is not then surprising that theological interests have been piqued as well.4  
Hence, Anthony Thiselton considers the issue as one of the most significant developments in 
biblical hermeneutics.5  
I contend that an expanded understanding of language has the potential to enlarge the very 
ground upon which knowing God occurs. For not only does it bear meaningful messages, it also 
offers the meaning of itself. To better know language is to better know its Maker. Understanding 
how it behaves in front of, in, and behind texts funds a deeper appreciation of both what God says 
and who God is. Thus informed, Christian communities might become more than textual 
communities, instead becoming Sprachengemeinschaften in which the Spirit graciously enlivens 
the Word to greater glory with, by, through, and in, language. 
It should be now noted that my interests are primarily directed toward Christian 
communities generally hospitable to two pertinent presuppositions underpinning my work. First, I 
accept mystery as a reality, including the mysteries of a triune God and a bodily resurrected Christ. 
Second, I presume the inspiration of Scripture, that being the Holy Spirit’s supervision of the 
formation, transmission, and reception of the scriptural texts, including ongoing divine presence 
in the lives of today’s reader/speaker/hearer.  
Further, I acknowledge that my perspective is shaped heavily according to my experience 
in and migration away from American conservative evangelicalism. Given this tradition’s ninety 
million adherents,6 I find it both important and of personal interest to include some attention to its 
relevant assumptions. I do not pretend that my consideration will or can be objective, but I will 
endeavor to be fair. 
My discussion will begin unconventionally with a fictional narrative offered for the 
purpose of creating an interpretive atmosphere for the assertions that follow. I will then provide 
 
3 R. Scott Smith and J. P. Moreland, Truth and the New Kind of Christian: The Emerging Effects of Postmodernism 
in the Church (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 2005), 30. 
4 David Larsen, Telling the Old Story (Grand Rapids: Kregel Publications, 2000), 53. 
5 Anthony Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of Transforming Biblical Reading, 
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992), 470. 
6 Edward Babinski, Leaving the Fold (Amherst: Prometheus 1995), 22. 
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an overview of language per se, including an examination of the paradigms of Paul Ricoeur’s 
worlds of words, as well as the implications of a variety of literary elements. Finally, I will consider 
how all of this might actually matter as a means to actualize authentic relationship with a talkative 
Creator. 
Language Experienced; a Creative Excursus. 
A primary assumption underlying this paper is that language evokes an epistemological 
and hermeneutic encounter. Therefore, the short story below invites the reader into an experience 
with language through its employment of a number of literary devices that serve as a preface to 
what follows. Titled, Gilad and the Sea, the story is told from Jesus’ point-of-view.  
 
Gilad and the Sea 
Before my ascension, I made a small fire just before dawn along the Sea of Galilee. I was 
staring into the coals, weeping, when a fisherman’s young son, Gilad, suddenly appeared out of 
the darkness. He asked, “Why do you weep, Master?” 
I knew the boy. He and his mother were followers of mine and I loved them both. “Many 
shall soon suffer for my name’s sake,” I said. My heart was heavy. “Great is their reward in 
heaven. But others whom I do not know will soon claim my name and they will teach what I have 
not taught. They will not follow in the Way I have shown you …woe to them. That is when truth 
shall be a thing much coveted but little loved. In that time, boy, go to the sea and remember.” 
“Some of your followers are hiding in the cliffs near Arbel,” Gilad said. “My mother thinks 
we should flee to the caves.” 
“Do not worry about tomorrow, for tomorrow will take care of itself.” 
It was then when his mother, Leah, came. She was laughing. “Yeshua, I’ve brought some 
tilapia and some bread. I thought Peter would be outraged to eat fish from Ezra’s boats!” 
I was glad she came. She lifted my spirit and I began to laugh with her. “There is the 
silhouette of his boat,” I said. “See, out there…against the gray light? All night Peter has caught 
nothing. He washes his empty net on one side of the boat and then yells at Andrew to do the same 
on the other!” 
Gilad did not laugh with us.   
Leah saw what I saw. “It is hard for Gilad to laugh,” she whispered. “His father cannot 
bear that a fisherman’s son fears the water. He badgers the boy day and night. I once hoped for 
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you to take his fear away but you passed us by in Capernaum and did nothing.” The tone in her 
voice had turned suddenly bitter. 
“I know the day.” 
“Then why did you not help?”  
“Why did you not ask?” 
 
**  
 
The three of us fell silent for a short time before Phineas, the husband of Leah and the 
father of Gilad entered the firelight. “Woman, you left my bed! You, boy, should be sorting fish. 
And we need gall for your grandfather’s eye…” 
“I asked them to help me,” I said as we all stood. 
“Who the devil are you?” 
Leah answered with eyes lowered. “Husband, it is he, Yeshua of Nazareth.” 
“Yeshua’s flesh rots in Jerusalem.”  
“No, husband…but do not be afraid…” 
“I fear nothing,” he said. “You, stranger, let me see your hands.” 
I held my palms to the campfire. “Many see and do not believe.” 
“Husband, the messengers have told the truth…” 
“Truth? What is truth? Once I heard the real Yeshua of Nazareth blabber alongside my 
fish cart on the way to Magdala. I was parched as dry sand and he said his truth could quench 
thirst with everlasting water. But he was as dried up as the rest of us. What kind of truth is that?” 
I smiled to myself. He was right. Meaningless words are not true words. “You speak 
rightly,” I said.  
Emboldened, he fixed his eyes on mine. “So, tell me now, before I summon the rabbi to 
have you dragged away. Who are you?    
“I AM.”  
“You are what? You are the truth again?” 
“It is so,” I said. 
“What is so?” 
“I AM is Truth.” 
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“Speak so I can understand.” 
Phineas was flustered; understanding had not been given to him because he had not walked 
with us. But I answered him. “An olive must be tasted before its tree is understood. You do not 
understand how truth is because you do not eat my fruit.  
“But I do understand your tree, Phineas. I was hung upon it. And its fruits are the holes in 
my palms…and the scars on your wife’s cheek.” I felt heat suddenly rising within me. 
“My wife is none of your concern. She is a liar; she deserves the back of my hand.” 
“Deeds spring from words as petals burst from buds. Be warned. In the Judgment to come, 
the words of my Father will not return void!”  
“Who is your father that I should be afraid?” said Phineas. “It is my son who should be 
afraid of his father. I judge him to be worthless. Gilad fears the sea. Who has heard of such a thing 
for the son of a fisherman! He weeps like a little girl on my vessel and shames my name.” 
I searched the man’s soul. “A son fears a wicked father; the wicked father fears his own 
secrets. Who has more to fear?” 
“Secrets are hidden. They have no power. The son has more to fear,” he said. 
“Phineas, I know your secrets; they are terrors. Like demons they torment you. The day is 
coming when all the world will know them. You are to be pitied.” 
“I do not fear my secrets and I spit on your pity!” 
“Then hear me if you can: A rich man had three sons. One blind, one deaf, and one dumb. 
Which did he love the most?” 
“How could he love any of them?” asked Phineas. 
“You fool. You are one son who is blind, deaf, and dumb. Your Father is merciful and 
offers his love. But heed my words: you will not love him until you learn to fear the sea.” 
 
** 
 
As you might think, the exchange was uncomfortable for us all. But the man was imprisoned 
by pride and tormented by secret demons. He did not seek refuge in the Rock, but within his own 
self.  
No sooner had Phineas left us when Gilad turned to me. “Tell me, Teacher, how might I 
find peace with the sea?” 
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I looked at his young face, shadowed delicately by the firelight. I glanced eastward where 
a red horizon bode well for the coming day. “Come,” I said. 
We walked to the water’s edge. The night had been calm so the wavelets lapped lightly. 
“There,” I said. “About four hundred cubits away is Peter’s boat. Call across the water to him 
and the others.” 
The boy cupped his mouth and cried in his high voice, “Have you fish?” 
Peter and Thomas answered with oaths and I laughed. “See, when you cast your voice over 
water it travels far and finds the ears of many. But when you shout against the cliffs above the 
Sephoris highway, your voice is returned to you, empty.” 
He nodded. 
“Do you remember the day you gave Andrew your two whiskered fishes and five barley 
loaves in the desert near Bethsaida?” 
“Of course. You fed many thousands of us with them.” 
“Yes. And I was pleased with you that day for bringing me your basket so willingly…But 
after all had eaten I sent the twelve away in their boat toward Gennesaret whilst I bade the 
multitude farewell. I then walked some distance to climb a low mountain where I prayed in view 
of the sea. A strong south-western wind blew through my hair all the night and I decided to make 
my way back to the shore before dawn. 
“I stood there like we are standing here. The sea boasted a different kind of beauty than 
today. It was not soft and gentle, but was ruffled with white-capped waves that ran at the beach 
like the arena runners in Tiberius.” 
“Were you not afraid for your disciples?” Gilad asked. 
“No, but I knew they were afraid and were weary from fighting the contrary winds. 
So…and this is the part I love to remember…I decided to walk over the water and greet them.” 
Gilad had heard the story but had never believed it to be true. “You were not afraid?” 
I smiled. “Little brother, hear me: the sea is a thing of majesty; it is always what it is, yet 
it is never the same. It is seen and unseen, it surprises us but we are never deceived; it swallows 
some to death and furnishes a bounty of life to others. It rises and falls by winds and rain but is 
always secured by a bed of rock. If you listen, you will hear its voice…” 
“You are talking about Yahweh.” 
I was pleased. He had begun to understand. “Yes,” I said.  
98  BCW, VOL. 2, NO. 1 
 
“And you want my father to fear the sea because you want him to fear Yahweh,” he said. 
“I want your father to understand that the sea will be what it is, and that he has no power 
over it. His boasts mean nothing. If a man can humble himself before the sea, he can walk with 
God.”  
Gilad stared across the black-blue water. The low hills near Capernaum were catching the 
first slants of the sun now edging the eastern horizon. “Please, Master, go on with your story.” 
“Well, to answer your question, I was not afraid because I love all that the sea is.” 
“Even as you love the Father.” 
My heart soared. “Yes! And so, I began to walk amidst the waves and I wept for joy. My 
Father was all around me. From the water I felt him move with me, in the wind I felt the breath of 
the Spirit, the far mountains made me sure, the breaking light guided my way. In all these things I 
heard his voice saying, “This is my beloved Son.”  
“But then, ah, then, I approached the little boat. It was heaving; its shredded sail fluttered 
impotently in the wind. John spotted me first but Nathanial cried out, “A ghost!” I waved but it 
seemed that Thomas had fainted straightaway. So, I quickly shouted, “Be of good cheer; it is I!” 
I can still see Peter climbing over Andrew’s back. “Lord,” he said, “say the word and I will come 
to you.” 
Gilad’s mouth was hanging open. I laughed out loud. “Boy?” 
“Peter said that?” 
“Yes,” I chuckled. “And here’s why I tell you this story. Do you know why I changed his 
name to Peter?” 
“No.” 
“He is my rock.” 
Gilad thought for a long moment. Then he realized something special. “Master, your Rock 
asked to walk on the water. Rocks don’t float!” 
“Ha! Right,” I laughed. “After Rock asked to walk on the water I said, “Come,” and he 
did. I was very proud of him…poor impulsive Peter. I love him so.” 
“And then what?” asked Gilad. 
“Well, we walked toward one another, he being all smiles and chest out. But he then took 
his eyes off mine and looked at the windswept sea; he began to sink. “Lord, save me!” he cried. I 
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lunged for his thick hand and lifted his feet to the surface. “Why did you doubt?” I said. “Why so 
little faith?” Then we climbed aboard the boat and I ordered the wind to stop.” 
Gilad stared at me in wonder for the longest time. I blessed him. Then I had him face the 
waters, squarely. “Now tell me, Gilad, what do you see?” 
“Everything, my Lord.” 
“Do you fear what is before you?” 
“Yes. And I love it, as well.” 
“Then come,” I said. “Let us take a little walk of our own.” 
In the Beginning…Language? 
 “By the word of the Lord the heavens were made; for he spoke, and it came to be; he 
commanded and it stood firm.” (Ps 33). 
The third verse of the first chapter of Genesis announces the birth of Creation: “And God 
said…” God spoke, and the universe was formed. God-speech…language…is at the very 
foundation of all that is. 
This claim is related to the scriptural claim that God is love (1 John 4:8). At love’s core is 
relationship; love seeks an object with which to commune or it cannot exist at all. One way or 
another, lovers must commune. Language is, therefore, essential to love.  
Intrinsic to Scripture is a Trinitarian ontology of God, a mysterious unity of three Persons 
among whom love flows.7 As such God is as relationship. Soskice offers, “the Trinity is 
friendship,” a relationship she describes as one of speaking and listening.8 Referring to passages 
in the New Testament such as John 16:13-15, and John 17, Poythress makes a similar claim, 
arguing that the Persons of the Trinity function as members of an intercommunicative community.9  
Going beyond relationship, Poythress asserts that divine relational discourse actualizes its 
essence meaningfully by way of divine speech at and in the creation. He writes, “If indeed God 
spoke to create the world, then the world from its beginning, and down to its roots, is structured 
by God’s language.”10 The Word speaks and creation becomes according to the Creator’s words, 
 
7 Janet Soskice, The Kindness of God; Metaphor, Gender, and Religious Language (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007),161. 
8 Ibid., 161, 180. 
9 Vern Poythress, In the Beginning was the Word; Language, a God-Centered Approach, (Wheaton: Crossway Books, 
2009), 22. 
10 Ibid., 24. 
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and in its continuous becoming it effectively exists grounded in language. And so, “language is 
not an alien imposition on the world but the very key to is being and its meaning.”11 Poythress 
concludes: “The created world, as a result of God’s speech, bears within it from top to bottom a 
kind of quasilinguistic character.”12  
Others agree. Hugh of Saint Victor (as quoted by Umberto Eco) claims, “the entire sensible 
world is a book written by the hand of God…All visible things (are) presented to us by a symbolic 
instruction…proposed for the signifying of things invisible.”13 And turning to Paul: “Ever since 
the creation of the world his eternal power and divine nature, invisible though they are, have been 
understood and seen through the things he has made.” (Rom 1:20). God has offered a language-
imbedded cosmos to humankind as something of a meta-metaphor, a revelatory transcription that 
is according to the will of the Word who speaks.  
Among the objects of Creation is humankind. Made in the image of God, she, too, is offered 
as something of a window into divine nature. The anthropology of selves-in-relation imitates, in 
part, the relational attributes of God; its communicative necessities do likewise. Accordingly, I 
contend that one finds language in humankind because one finds language in the divine, and the 
qualities of human language reflect the qualities of its Creator. As previously noted, Poythress 
makes the important claim that God has impressed his Trinitarian character on (human) language, 
ourselves made in God’s own image.”14 Hence, I believe it is reasonable to assert that who God is, 
language does. Put another way, language behaves according to the qualities of its Maker. 
Therefore, it should be recognized as offering more than the messages it bears. 
Some, however, vigorously resist associating God and language too closely, fearing the 
identification of language with God might lead to its identification as God. So conservative 
evangelicals like Scott Smith complain that post-modern theologians are clambering about on 
dangerous ground, perilously toying with language as constitutive of reality instead of 
representative.15 I answer that slippery slope arguments are unremarkable. Any image of God on 
 
11 Ibid., 24. 
12 Vern Poythress, “Science as Allegory,” in The Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation 35 (1983), 
https://www.asa3.org/ASA/PSCF/1983/JASA6-83Poythress.html. 
13 Umberto Eco, “The Scandal of Metaphor: Metaphorology and Semiotics,” in Poetics Today, 4, no. 2 (1983), 235. 
14 Poythress, In the Beginning, 22. 
15 Smith and Moreland, Truth, 40. 
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earth is subject to abuse without losing its inherent identification with its referent. If in doubt, one 
might consider humankind.  
That said, I must be clear: I do not claim God to be language. I further contend that language 
does not and cannot reveal God—only God reveals God. Language may be revelatory, but it is not 
revelation.16  
But objections can also be heard from beyond conservative circles. For example, Sandra 
Schneiders relies on principles of metaphor to disassociate God and language. She presupposes 
language to be a purely human phenomenon and thus innately finite.17 Therefore, any attempt to 
think of God in literal discourse upsets that which is necessary to metaphor, i.e. the polar tension 
between what is and is not.18  
Wolterstorff reacts to Schneiders by name, agreeing with her obvious is not of a divine 
larynx yet challenging her with an important is. What is in God-speech is the reality of divine 
illocution, i.e. the force or command of God as mediated by the Spirit through the scriptures.19  
The idea of God speaking can be understood as a metaphor for all sorts of actual divine languaging. 
The point is important for as Ricoeur remarks, “The fact that the Lord speaks is what is essential.”20   
The arguments are helpful but, in the end, one hopes that all sides might agree with Wright 
that “we need to understand better than we commonly do, how language works.”21 But to what 
end? Trevor Hart makes the point that “the ultimate object of Christian theological concern and 
exploration is God himself, as he has given himself and gives himself to be known.”22 I contend 
that a deeper understanding of the nature of language contributes mightily to that end. 
Admittedly, fixing fast to a definitive view of language is a difficult task in the first place; 
it is like grasping water. Hart refers to language as “mercurial in its capacity to slip through our 
 
16 This is a proper concern of special interest to Barth. See Anthony Clark, Divine Revelation and Human Practice; 
Responsive and Imaginative Participation (Eugene: Cascade, 2008), 2. 
17 Sandra Schneiders, The Revelatory Text: Interpreting the New Testament as Sacred Scripture (Collegeville: The 
Liturgical Press, 1999), 28-29. 
18 Ibid., 31. Metaphor to be more thoroughly discussed below. 
19 Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 10; see also Brevard 
Childs, “Speech-act Theory and Biblical Interpretation,” in The Scottish Journal of Theology, 58- 4 (2005), 380. Note: 
speech-act theory will be discussed in greater detail below. 
20 Thiselton, New Horizons, 74. 
21 N.T. Wright, The New Testament and the People of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992) 63. 
22 Trevor Hart, Faith Thinking: The Dynamics of Christian Theology (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 1995) 96. 
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fingers;” 23 Gadamer considers the workings of language to be a mystery.24 But elusiveness 
notwithstanding, language is integral to the Creation; its communicative qualities have been 
imbedded in the fabric of all things and in so being, point to who God is. Thus, it is important that 
one plunges her hands into the well over and over again in hopes of cupping something.  
Until this point I have considered language as inclusive of all sorts of semiotic expressions 
because the full range of words and wordless imagery is essential for language’s full labor and 
complete being. Certainly, the cello of Yo-Yo Ma invokes the language codes of mood; 
Rembrandt’s “The Prodigal” prompts cognitive and emotive responses. And, importantly, the 
figurative expressions of the apocalyptic scriptures are revelatory of God at the center of types. In 
fact, such figuration leads Sandra Schneiders to make the observation that “symbolic revelation is 
characteristic of a God who offers and invites but does not compel response.”25 (I find this to be 
an ironic comment for Schneiders who typically resists the whole idea of God speaking, but it 
remains a profitable example of the ontological relationship between language and God. However, 
I would add that she also omits the effect of grace in enabling response…an effect warranted by a 
God who really speaks.) Indeed, the reach of language extends far beyond human imagination and 
is wonderful to contemplate, yet space now requires my turning the discussion to words.    
 
Situating Discourse: The Worlds of Word and Words. “The sum of thy word is truth;” 
Psalms 119:163. 
To state the obvious, one thinks with words. But, single words generally do little more than 
identify a referent. So that when one says Israel, an image of Abraham’s son is just as valid as the 
Hebrew nation, etc. Schneiders rightly argues that words alone do not mean at all.26 Words need 
context and that begins with sentences. But sentences are context-dependent as well, finding 
clearer meaning in relation to preceding and subsequent sentences (a principle particularly 
important in approaching the scriptures).27 That is why Malina insists that sentences may yield 
 
23 Ibid.,135. 
24 Bruce Ellis Benson citing Hans-Georg Gadamer, “Now I Would Not Have You Ignorant,” in Evangelicals and 
Scripture: Tradition, Authority, and Hermeneutics, eds. Vincent Bacote, Laura Miguelez, and Dennis Okholm, 
(Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 2004), 191. 
25 Sandra Schneiders, The Revelatory Text, 55. 
26 Ibid., 162. 
27 Gordon Fee and Douglas Stuart, How to Read the Bible for All Its Worth (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2003), 27. 
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complete thoughts but not complete meanings.28 What is finally needed is an interplay of 
contextualized words, or discourse—defined by Ricoeur as the language acts equal or greater to a 
sentence.29  
Language acts is of course, a very broad category indeed, and can include everything from 
interpretative sensory responses (sound, sight) to speech acts and linguistic structures. But the 
more context that is provided for discourse generally, the more meaning is likely. That is why an 
entire play conveys more than a single act; a whole novel offers more than a chapter. That is why 
Hart insists that Christian communities learn to appreciate the importance of approaching Scripture 
as a whole (emphasis mine).30  
With words understood as pointers to meaning and with contextualized words more 
effectively empowered, I will now consider more precisely the contexts in which discursive 
meaning happens. I should note that thus far I have conducted my discussion with words both 
written and spoken in view. I must now narrow my attention further to the written word—to text.     
Drawing heavily on Ricoeur, literary theorists have considered discourse to be situated in 
three primary worlds, i.e. the world behind the text, the world in the text, and the world in front of 
the text. As language theory has evolved, these perspectives on the worlds of words have taken 
their places historically in the order noted above.  
Until the first half of the twentieth century, classical literary criticism was most interested 
in the author, her motivations, personal narrative, etc. leading to a pre-occupation with what lay 
behind the text. Gilad and the Sea might therefore pose the questions of why the author included 
this story in this way—and how would that answer alter the story’s meaning? 
The New Criticism of the 1940’s challenged literary criticism’s authorial primacy, 
however, suggesting a formalist reading, or as Green and Turner claim, a hermeneutical realism 
that locates meaning in the text’s evocation of linguistic convention.31 Attention had moved from 
clues lying behind the text, to the myriad of opportunities in the text, itself.  I return to Gilad and 
the Sea. The world in that text includes the dialogic authority of text-as-conversation, and the 
 
28 Bruce Malina, Christian Origins and Cultural Anthropology (Atlanta: John Knox, 1986), 3. 
29 Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, Vol. I, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), ix. 
30 Trevor Hart, “Tradition, Authority, and a Christian Approach to the Bible as Scripture” in Between Two Horizons: 
Spanning New Testament Studies & Systematic Theology, eds.  Joel Green and Max Turner (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
2000),196. 
31 Joel Green and Max Turner, “New Testament Commentary and Systematic Theology: Strangers or Friends?”  in 
Between Two Horizons, eds. Green and Turner, 5. 
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grounding presence of propositions, etc. A grasp of their contribution to the overall meaning-
making of the story become a focus. 
Nevertheless, such elements also proved (and are proving) to be an insufficient means to 
comprehensively understand language. As Brueggemann states, “We now recognize that there is 
no interest-free interpretation… it is an illusion to think so.”32 Postmodernism has made a 
compelling case for the contextual derivation of meaning, realizing that every reader brings a 
“horizon of expectation” to the text.33 Meanings are fashioned under the influence of standpoint 
and so the world in front of the text is thus discovered. Gilad and the Sea provides an opportunity 
to consider how a narrative in toto prompts the languaging of meaning. What is it about how I read 
this story that makes it mean something to me? 
Theological inquiry has followed in parallel form. As examples, liberal historic/redactic-
critics and conservative textual critics have ironically dwelt together largely in the worlds behind 
the texts and/or in the texts, whereas more recent linguistic turns have tracked loosely with literary 
interests in the world in front of the texts.34  
Ricoeur’s paradigms are surely helpful, but his paradigms are not without some peril. If 
not handled carefully, the evolution of language theory risks partitioning the whole of language 
into disconnected pieces. Even Ricoeur recognizes that meaning ultimately happens in the 
conversation that transcends his worlds. 35  
Trevor Hart offers an important reminder: “Reading the Bible as Scripture is never a mere 
matter of handling texts and the relationship between texts. It is above all a matter of being in the 
presence and open to the handling of the One…whose story it tells.”36 Indeed, the Holy Spirit 
remains present within the biblical witness, but is also active within the entire process of divine 
languaging, whether that occurs in the Scriptures, the book of nature, or in any other form of divine 
discourse. If meaning is to be rendered at all it must find its locus in the Spirit’s work, which is 
why Treier comments that it is the Spirit who takes up the linguistic slack between the many worlds 
of meaning.37 We should remember that language is an interdependent totality that is best 
 
32 Walter Brueggemann, Theology in the Old Testament (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1997), 63. 
33 Thiselton, New Horizons, 34. 
34 Daniel Treier, “Canonical Unity and Commensurable Language,” in Evangelicals, eds. Bacote, et al, 212. 
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understood according to its affinity with Christ—the Word—as its unifying center. Thus, a 
Christian understanding of both language theory and theology must be firstly clothed by a doctrine 
of God.38  
With the active presence of the Spirit hereafter presumed, I will offer a discussion of each 
of Ricoeur’s worlds. However, I will consider them in reverse order from their historical 
development since to do otherwise would be to naively ignore their own effects. 
The World in Front of the Text: Words as Encounter. 
The Reader. 
Ricoeur’s world in front of the text refers to the complex universe of the reader. This 
universe consists of predispositions, suppositions, expectations, moods, motivations, memories—
a constellation of factors that interpret texts and thus create meanings when encountering text. 
Because of this reality the reader is rendered unable to interpret meaning within a sphere of 
objectivity. Polyani puts it this way: “The way in which we each see the world…is the only way 
in which we are able to see it—precisely as the view from where we are.”39  
As example of an encounter in front of the Word, Jesus informs Nicodemus of his need to 
be born again. (John 3). “How can a man be born when he is old?” Nicodemus answers. Having a 
limited frame of reference—no horizon of understanding 40--Nicodemus’ rhetorical reply reveals 
an interpretation organized according to his limited perspective. So it is with all who stand before 
the Word in text. As Hart bluntly states, “a naked reading of Scripture is in practice a convenient 
fiction.”41 
Growing awareness of this phenomenon among language theorists has contributed to the 
development of reader-response hypotheses which endeavor to explain the manner in which the 
predisposition of readers contributes to interpretation and the shaping of meaning. Husserl offers 
much on the relationship between meaning and reader intention, suggesting that all perception is 
a matter of perspective.42 Various emerging schools of thought provide any number of ideas on an 
expanding continuum. Stanley Fish is among those who would claim meaning to be utterly 
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39 Trevor Hart, Faith Thinking, (Eugene: Wipf and Stock, 1995), 61. 
40 Thiselton, New Horizons, 8. 
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indeterminate, hence ultimately created by the reader, herself.43 Some distance away would be 
others who acknowledge that readers do, in fact, “see through the glass, darkly” (I Cor 13:12), but 
who will not go so far as to discount some sort of fixivity. These include evangelicals like Bruce 
Benson who acknowledges the reality of horizons of interpretative perception but claims that any 
reader of the scriptures is able to adequately discern authorial intentions.44 
If nothing else, reader-response theorists have demonstrated the fact that something goes 
on between the reader and the text that ultimately fuels the derivation and management of meaning. 
I find Ricoeur’s world of the reader, then, not so much an existential question but rather a 
behavioral one. For example, to what extent does (can) a reader control the text? On what basis is 
interpretation validated? How is one interpretation valued over another? And what about the 
inevitable coercion that meaning anarchy would create? These questions take us beyond the scope 
and scale of this essay to be sure, but hopefully they will be addressed in future scholarship. 
 
The Imagination. 
Meaning ultimately is derived, and that requires the gathering of pieces into new patterns 
of thought, or as Hart calls it, “meaning-making.”45 This activity occurs within the faculty of 
human imagination, what Vanhoozer defines as “the cognitive faculty by which we see as a 
whole.”46 Wright claims it as what provides the “necessary leap for a person to verify 
perspective;”47 Hart asserts that it is the “all pervasive and transfiguring force within human life.”48 
In sum, the imagination is necessary to the formation of thought, the derivation of meaning, and 
the communication of ideas; its function in the world in front of the text can hardly be exaggerated. 
Of particular interest to me is the intriguing relationship that the imagination distills 
between fiction, truth, and meaning. For if the imagination is a heuristic activity that is necessary 
to meaning-making, then what might one say about its engagement with the epistemology of 
historical reference? Ricoeur devotes five chapters to the apparent gap between the fictive vantage 
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of the reader and the real history of the text, ultimately recognizing that historical knowledge is 
knowledge by faith.49  
It appears that an inescapable relationship does, in fact, exist between the imagination, 
meaning, and truth, although I agree with Wolterstorff that there are certain sufficiently warranted 
facts (truths) to which reasonable persons can assent.50 But the agency of imagination makes clear 
the reality of the fictive process even in the identification of such truths.  
Interestingly, Ricoeur argues that the truth claims of religious texts should be considered 
more like those of a poet than of the historian.51 While having elements of facticity, truth may be 
more fully understood as an organic, relational and even experiential essence with which we 
conduct discourse. This perspective applied to biblical truth claims suggests a person-to-meaning 
relationship that depends upon engagement through imaginative discourse.  
As a created agency redeemed by Christ, the imagination becomes the Spirit’s companion. 
George MacDonald’s Phantastes helped influence C. S. Lewis’ conversion by stirring a baptism 
of sorts within Lewis’ imagination. It is this kind of sanctified imagination that Hart points to in 
his impressive case for the connection between the imagination and the great gifts of the Spirit: 
faith—the reaching toward the not yet seen, hope—the creative re-description of the world, and 
love—the imaginative projection beyond our selves.52 In my mind, the baptized imagination 
conjures a lush pasture of possibilities in which my Shepherd leads me. As Stroup asserts, this 
liberating world “provides the images I need to bring order and meaning to the chaos of my 
personal history.”53  
However, some fear the imagination as a source of abuse. Genesis 6:5 sounds a warning: 
“And Jehovah saw the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the 
thoughts of his heart was only evil, continually.” Thus, some rein the imagination harshly. Larsen 
is one critic from the “Biblicist” camp (defined for this essay as those whose positions are in close 
agreement with the International Council on Biblical Inerrancy) who voices grave concerns about 
the way in which the rekindled interest in the imagination may potentially harm the faith. He warns 
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against placing interpretation inside the imagination for to do so is to abandon the text.54 Larsen’s 
fear is not without some merit; one should be wary of biblical interpretations that are born of sheer 
fantasy. But he fails to answer exactly where interpretation does take place if not inside the faculty 
designed to make meaning.  
Hart also sounds a warning, agreeing that an imagination un-renewed by the Spirit, i.e. the 
un-baptized imagination, has a great potential for evil. However, he importantly adds that this risk 
should not disqualify a hermeneutic of imagination any more than sin-tainted logic should 
disqualify a propositional hermeneutic. 55 What is needed is a center of gravity. 
 
The Community. 
It is self-evident that the Church considers the canon to be the primary source of textual 
authority. I have presupposed the supervision of the Holy Spirit in canonical formation, 
transmission, and application. However, this does not guarantee agreement in methods or in 
products of interpretation. On the contrary, the Church’s various communities have created 
culturally-embedded theological foundations which have produced a wide range of perspectives.56 
For example, though sharing modernist epistemologies, liberal and conservative traditions usually 
draw opposing conclusions.   
Barth notes that though the Church is “the reality of God’s revelation for us,” it is still a 
human institution.57 Graciously, God has chosen to speak through and by his Church despite 
creaturely imperfections. However, what if God has allowed for competing poles in order to 
encourage collisions of ideas? Widely corralled by the Spirit’s presence, it may be through lively 
polyphonic discourse within the Church that the Spirit continues to translate meaning (albeit 
fluidly) through time and tradition.58 As with the polyphonic relationship that Israel enjoyed, it 
falls to the Church to become in the world in front of the biblical texts. It is unity conjoined with 
diversity, coherence coexisting with dissimilarity, and homogeneity understood heterogeneously 
that should ultimately define the Church who worships a God similarly described.  In the end, one 
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hopes that through the Church, the scriptures may come alive to be, as Hart says, “a channel of our 
personal knowing of the God whose story it tells.”59  
While some may debate the merits of reader-response theories, the imagination or the role 
of the Church, few would disagree that the world in front of the text is exactly where people are. 
It is here, in front of text where, as Gadamar suggests, the horizon of the text and that of the reader 
ultimately fuse.60  But this is not only on account of what the reader brings to the text. Importantly, 
this fusion also occurs because of what the reader is brought by the Spirit.   
Thus, the world in front of the text is the site of gracious encounter—the locus of event. 61 
Its very being reveals God as willing to forego objectivity; a God who is fully aware of 
humankind’s incapacity to grasp understanding from some fixed point in the heavens. Instead, it 
reveals God as mercifully walking alongside his imperfect, biased, vision-impaired 
reader/hearer…even as he did in the Incarnation. 
 
The World in the Text: Words Alive. 
Ricoeur’s second world is that found in the text, that is to say, in the dynamic functions of 
literary genres that provide fields for meaning. It is this world in the text where words breathe, 
freely; it is where they simply are. Schneiders sees words, themselves, as “mediators of 
transformative encounter,” thus providing what she calls a “norming of interpretation.62 Comstock 
is clear about this world’s separation from the reader;63 Benson insists on its independent value: 
“Words have the power to express intentions.”64 And why not? As Hart challenges: “try to imagine 
how you might make sense of the world…if there were no words upon which to draw.”65 Thiselton 
claims yet more. Influenced by the Hebraic belief in the force of words (e.g. Isaac’s inability to 
revoke blessing on Esau), he states his conviction in the power of the texts to transform readers.66  
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Yet postmodern turns such as Gadamar’s warn that texts in themselves can become self-
limiting if not allowed to go beyond their self-contained meaning. 67 Green and Turner complain 
of attempts to interpret the text as it was, calling them formalist efforts.68  Still, no one would 
disregard a role for this world in the text, leaving the question: how does the world in the text 
mean? Answers could be offered according to any number of paradigms, e.g. performance—which 
identifies texts as ultimately actions, or perhaps poetics—as with Heidegger’s dichtendes 
Denken.69 With space constraints in view, I have chosen to respond with a brief review of speech-
act theory, metaphor, and dialogism before finishing with the important category of narrative 
which Ong claims to be “the primal way in which the human life world is organized verbally and 
intellectually.”70  
 
Speech-Act Theory. 
J. L. Austin writes, “It is no longer enough to assume that saying something is simply 
stating something.”71  His simple claim is profound: to say something is to do something.72 
Speaking evokes acts. Austin deconstructs the process into three movements found within 
discourse: first, locution, which is the utterance of a sense and reference, e.g. “Be witnesses unto 
me” (Acts 1:8); second, illocution, which is the conventional force of the words, e.g. command as 
per above, or perhaps promises, questions, warnings, etc. As example, illocutionary force is what 
challenges Phineas in Gilad and the Sea. Finally, perlocution which he considers the effects of 
illocutionary forces e.g. persuading, encouraging, dissuading, etc. 73 So, after Jesus’s command 
his followers did, in fact, become witnesses. 
What is important to story-telling is the intrinsic, inescapable relationship between the 
Story-teller’s speaking and the changes wrought in the reader/hearer. If one considers the Sermon 
on the Mount in Matthew 5-7, one is struck by Jesus’s speech performance. He employs 
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locutions—references to those who are persecuted, poor, merciful, etc. which, in turn, become 
illocutions of blessing and promise, resulting in perlocutionary responses of astonishment (7:28) 
and hope which ultimately change the world.  
As might be expected, Austin’s claims are not with their critics. Wolterstorff dissents from 
what he believes are behavioralist attempts to understand speaking as necessarily efficacious. In 
other words, he cautions against the conflation of illocutionary acts (declarations, rebuttals, et al) 
with perlocutionary actions. Instead, Wolterstorff holds illocution to be at the very heart of speech, 
independent from the capacity of the auditor to accurately comprehend and enact the intention of 
the speaker.74 However, he recognizes that one’s speech at the least influences the hearer.   
I find Wolterstorff’s parsing to be somewhat persuasive. Indeed, the hearer does not always 
understand and act in accordance with the intent of the speaker. But that is not to say that Austin’s 
perlocutive effects cannot happen. Furthermore, in the case of God-speech, I refer to the effects of 
the Holy Spirit on Austin’s dynamic. It is the Spirit who is busy actualizing the intended responses 
of God-speech, thus graciously enabling the intended performance of Christian drama in the life 
of the Church.  
If this is so, then I believe speech-act theory offers important insight into the nature of truth. 
As example: the Christian hears/reads the biblical texts which prompt an action (idea, behavior). 
That action (experience) fires the (metaphoric) conceptual processes about to be discussed below 
that seek cohesion between the Story and one’s own story. The result is the dynamic emergence 
of truth. Thus, hearing/listening (speech) and truth are necessarily related to acts—to doing. 
Accordingly, one might say that truth becomes by faith, listening. “My sheep hear my voice and I 
know them and they follow me.” (John 10:27) 
 
Metaphor.  
Perhaps the most gracious literary element is the metaphor—an agency of cognition that 
Umberto Eco suggests defies definition because it is that which does the defining. 75 Nevertheless, 
what can be said is that a functioning metaphor is a reference that is comprised of an is and an is 
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not, the distance between which provides a tension that invites the expansion of meaning beyond 
either pole. Gilad and the Sea has Gilad encountering GOD AS SEA.  
In John 6:35, Jesus says, “I am the bread of life…” Jesus is a sustainer/life-giver, but he is 
not literally a loaf of bread. The gap of meaning between is and is not is the space in which the 
imaginative impulse considers the possibilities of how he is bread while not really being bread.  
This gap is of great consequence, part of what Lakoff and Johnson consider an 
epistemological structure grounded in metaphoric concepts. For them, metaphor is more than a 
descriptive device—it is the cognitive process by which one unites reason and imagination to form 
understanding. This imaginative rationality is motivated by one’s natural urge to seek coherence, 
i.e., a desired state of harmony where life makes sense. Coherence is shaped by recurring 
experiences which form experiential gestalts that are, in fact, conceptualized metaphors.76  
For example, a person’s early experiences with ideas about faith may be shaped by the 
claim in 1 John 4 that “we dwell in him (Christ), and he in us.” Consequently, she begins to 
understand faith metaphorically in terms of a position, creating a faith gestalt conceptualized by 
the metaphor, FAITH IS A PLACE. 
However, she then may experience new ideas about the word dwelling. Considering 
dwelling as a verb instead of a noun is suddenly disruptive. This conflict conspires to change her 
understanding and since her purpose is to sustain a state of coherence she begins to re-
conceptualize faith. 77 Eventually, she beings to understand faith in terms of activity so she creates 
an additional metaphoric gestalt—FAITH IS ACTION.  
But something else is going on; the metaphors have overlapped to lead her to the shared 
conclusion that faith is dwelling with Christ. Lakoff and Johnson would call this a metaphoric 
entailment.78 In this example, not only does the entailment fit each metaphor separately, it links 
them, symbiotically. Entailments expand understanding by acting as lines of connectivity that 
amplify or modify metaphoric concepts otherwise detached. In so doing, they contribute to the 
lively nature of metaphor by creating and recreating webs of understanding amongst the many 
constellations of experiential gestalts.   
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I find Lakoff and Johnson’s epistemological use of metaphor to be compelling. With 
understanding grasped as an emergent process, truth becomes as a fruit of experience. Thus, as 
one’s own life story seeks coherence with the challenges of the Story, meaning is apprehended 
dynamically. Truth, then, is alive and very much engaged with the seeker.   
With all its mysteries, metaphor is a gift of grace. Like metaphor, God’s interest is in 
coherence without conformity. Inviting humankind to know him better through a labyrinth of 
imprecise pathways is revelatory of a God who does not demand fixivity, convention or perhaps 
even orthodoxy, but rather graciously enables possibilities. 
 
Dialogism.  
The texts of Scripture offer more than words, they offer encounter; the reader/hearer is 
invited to listen, argue, question and otherwise expand discourse through conversation in which, 
as Thiselton notes, the text and reader/hearer interrogate one another.79 Mikhail Bakhtin calls this 
a “dialogic event,” that is, an event in which two or more voices explore truth.80 Some debate 
exists about the particulars of these events. For example, Gadamar supports the idea that 
conversation is the locus of interpretation while Ricoeur argues that interpretation occurs after the 
dialogue ends.81 Nevertheless, the important point is that texts talk with readers who respond 
wherever meaning happens.82  
This talking with is especially cogent when one considers the work of the Holy Spirit in 
illuminating, listening, convicting, and inspiring via Word-as-text through a polyphony of images, 
ideas, and identities that enable response. The very presence of dialogue means that the Spirit does 
not overwhelm her/his conversation partner; she/he allows the exchange of discourse to continue, 
highly suggestive of greater interest in the discussion than conclusions. Importantly, Brueggemann 
recognizes a Hebrew God who chooses to remain in the fray, one who encourages relentless 
negotiation, petition, provisional settlements and appeals amongst many voices and with no 
interest in closing the arguments by sealing the texts against further conversation.83 He writes, 
“For Israel and for Israel’s God, there is no deeper joy, no more serious requirement, no more 
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inescapable burden, than to be reengaged in the process of exchange that never arrives but is 
always on the way.”84 (This may leave one wondering if Jehovah was ironically disappointed in 
Abraham’s failure to negotiate for Isaac’s life; no record of a conversation exists after Genesis 
22:2.) 
I am left impressed with two observations about a God-in-conversation. First and foremost, 
it affirms the relational nature of the Story-teller…one does not normally have a conversation with 
oneself. This should be self-evident and I posit that no other element of language reveals 
relationship more clearly.  
Second, an awareness of God-in-dialogue widens the lens on truth. Like Bakhtin, Ricoeur 
recognizes what Socrates had observed, i.e. truth is a dialogic event which happens in the space 
created in conversation.85 Bakhtin argues that truth cannot be grasped within a single mind, instead 
truth requires multiple participants. Newsome adds that ideas are never atomistic: “An idea does 
not live in a person’s isolated consciousness, but only so far as it enters into dialogical relations 
with other ideas…and may develop new possibilities in the encounter with alien ideas.”86 These 
ideas are reminiscent of the experiential nature of truth argued by Lakoff and Johnson, and as 
suggested by speech-act theory.  
Truth understood in terms of experience leads me to wonder if questions about truth and 
meaning should be put in terms of how is truth instead of what or even who is truth. Such an 
approach stands in stark contrast to long-standing notions of monologic truth which presuppose 
the idea of a separate thought, that is, an independent, propositional truth-claim that can be 
apprehended by a single consciousness.  
The effect of modernist notions of truth has been the attempt to disentangle the polyphonic 
voice of the canon into a collection of single voices from which competing theological systems 
glean propositions.87 In contrast, dialogism inserts the reader/hearer into a unity of event rather 
than a unity of system.88 So Borg writes, “The monarchial model of biblical authority is replaced 
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by a dialogic model…the canon names the primary collection of ancient documents with which 
Christians are to be in dialogue (emphasis mine).”89  
But Bakhtin offers yet more; he lauds a textual polyphonic dialogue, that is, a text in which 
the author yields his mono-dominance in favor of a multiplicity of voices which leave discussions 
open-ended, thus making so-called conclusions available to the reader/hearer in the form of 
unfettered  possibilities. Thiselton cites the Book of Job as an example of a particular polyphonic 
text pointing to dialogic truth.90 Here the dialogue between God, Job, and Job’s friends is ironic, 
elusive, and ambiguous, defying attempts to shrink Job into a proposition; the author does not 
impose a conclusion.  For Bakhtin the scriptures are polyphonic…a symphony of many voices 
within which truth is revealed. Soskice applauds his claim, adding that the Bible’s heroes are 
“never objects but always subjects, predestined to be free by the divine author  so that they continue 
with readers through time in an inconclusive conversation.” 91 
However, one does wonder how far to push the Bakhtin model. On one hand its zeal in 
recognizing the conversational dynamic of Scripture is enlivening, but on the other I find some 
discomfort in the potential for abandoning meaning to the chaos of a chat as if truth is simply its 
exploration. Further, Bakhtin’s dialogism in its purest form dismembers the holistic nature of the 
canon by resisting the notion of single authorship in favor of his polyphonicism. Newsome 
reluctantly concedes that the Holy Spirit might be considered as the single Author of a polyphonic 
Bible, but if so, she charges that Bakhtin’s dialogism would then be limited to an interpretative 
attempt to discover some ultimate ending that dialogism would not otherwise permit.92  
This leaves me wondering about the role of the Spirit. I am not convinced that the mysteries 
of the Spirit’s presumed monologism (Trinitarian discourse aside) cannot coexist in polyphonic, 
dialogic intercourse. In fact, I find comfort in a unified Voice superintending a polyphony of 
voices. It seems analogous to a skilled conductor’s inspiration of the divergent instruments of his 
orchestra.  
The debate over the particulars notwithstanding, the discovery of language used 
dialogically by the Word is a ripe harvest of hope bursting with meaning about a God who wants 
 
89 Marcus Borg, Reading the Bible Again for the First Time (New York: Harper/San Francisco, 2002), 30. 
90 Thiselton, New Horizons, 298. 
91 Janet Soskice, The Kindness of God; Metaphor, Gender, and Religious Language (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 179. 
92 Newsome, “Bakhtin” in The Journal of Religion 76-2, 297. 
116  BCW, VOL. 2, NO. 1 
 
to talk with his people and not at them—who treats his beloved as subjects and not only objects. 
The Sprachengemeinschaften should find joy in this and should embrace such freedom by 
emboldening their conversations with one another and their Lord.  
Schökel helpfully suggests particular attention be given to the power of liturgy as an agency 
of dialogue with the biblical texts.93 Space denies a discussion of liturgical significance, but suffice 
it to say that liturgy provides coherence, unity and homogeneity for the divergent voices of the 
Church through time; it performs a discourse of constancy with a Story-teller who is not a lecturer 
but a conversationalist.94 
 
Telling Stories  
“That is why I tell these stories, because people see what I do but they don’t really see. 
They hear what I say but they don’t really hear, and they don’t understand.” (Matt 13:13).  
Recent attention to the role of narrative has enlivened the Good News for many by 
welcoming the life stories of individuals into the Grand Narrative of Jesus. However, it seems that 
no one knows precisely what the term means.95 Drawing on my own profession, I will simply 
define narrative as a sequence of events in which change occurs to produce meaning.   
Longenecker makes the claim that “human existence is experienced in narrative terms,” 
sharing Wright’s placing of narrative “at the heart of the matter between worldview and theological 
articulations.” 96 Thiselton considers the narrative-world of text as key in granting transforming 
effects;97 Work lauds story as “the world in which God’s world encounters ours with power…(it) 
reshapes our understanding.”98 And story contributes mightily to the formation of identity. Stroup 
writes, “people tell stories about themselves in order to identify themselves to one another.”99   
But not everyone is pleased with narrative as a hermeneutic. For example, Larsen wants 
preachers to tell stories better but warns of literary theorists prowling about as if to change the very 
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concept of scripture.100 Likewise, Sproul reminds his readers that “building doctrine from 
narratives alone is a dangerous business…we all must be careful to resist this.”101 For these, then, 
narrative seems reduced into a useful form of illustration—a clever assistant in the explanation of 
propositional truth.  
It remains a matter of debate as to whether the Bible should be seen primarily as a narrative 
or whether narrative is simply one of a number of genres contained within it. I find myself in 
agreement with Thiselton’s claim that “story is the overarching category in which others 
(doctrines, etc.) are contextualized.”102 I believe narrative does, indeed, provide the umbrella that 
organizes the chronicles, parables, dialogues, stories, expositions, and propositions that live within 
the scriptures. As Longenecker rightly claims, even the Pauline letters presuppose an underlying 
narrative history.103  
The debate is helpful, however, particularly in how it reveals a priori assumptions about 
words and Word. But much has been written already and I find myself less interested in recounting 
the arguments than I am by asking a different question: What does the language of Story reveal 
about the Story-teller? 
The Storyteller is Gracious.  
Ricoeur has done interesting work in his series aptly titled, Time and Narrative. He notes 
that “time becomes human to the extent it is articulated through a narrative mode, and narrative 
attains its full meaning when it becomes a condition of temporal existence.”104 His point is that 
narrative accommodates time, becoming trans-cultural. The Story-teller abandons his time-realm 
in order to enjoin his reader/hearer and so he is gracious in his Incarnation. God’s willingness to 
trans-culturate into human time reveals his love and his desire to so identify with his reader/hearer 
that he becomes one of them. “He made himself of no reputation and took upon him the form of a 
servant, and was made in the likeness of men.” (Philippians 2:7).  
To enjoin the reader/hearer, the Story-teller humbly works within the variations that 
language offers. For example, some might respond best to the written texts because of their 
inherent advantage of fixation. Others argue that oral discourse is more powerful because of the 
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advantages of performance, leading Ong to assert that “writing is not just a visual equivalent of 
speech.”105 In that same vein, Ricoeur points to Plato’s comment that communication is ended 
when living speech gives way to notation.106 Then again, Patte invokes Austin and Searle’s work 
claiming (perhaps a bit too enthusiastically) that texts are to be considered as speech acts.107 And 
Ong qualifies his own comment by acknowledging that the biblical text is finally able to absorb 
what he considers the death implicit in Plato’s view because of the resurrection of Jesus Christ.108  
In all of this, language remains graciously adequate for discourse in its summoning of 
imaginative activity through many categories which open gaps for the filling. Linguistic features 
such as paradox, contradiction, humor, poetry, allegory, simile, song and satire even serve as 
flexible opportunities for fruitful ambiguity. For example, irony—the contrast between the explicit 
and the implicit—challenges the temptation to find exact correspondence between words and 
things because it opens space for alternative meaning; the Story-teller uses irony to chase the last 
word far away.109 In the ironic story of Abraham and Isaac one is left reeling with a seemingly 
endless parade of why’s, what ifs, and yes, buts. Allowing for uncertainty and even confusion is 
evidence of grace at work because the story does not demand conformity. 
In the end, the fact that God speaks at all is an act of grace. And the Good News of the 
Christian narrative is particularly good news; it is a love story that overwhelms this writer’s 
abilities. I will leave the splendor of its telling to the Story itself. If one listens carefully, she can 
even learn much about God’s grace in what is not told. 
The Story-teller Cares. 
God wants his fusion of worlds to be effectual; he wants his Story to bear fruit because he 
cares about his reader/hearers: “I come that they might have life, and that they might have it more 
abundantly.” (John 10:10).  Ricoeur, like Malina, observes that narrative has an inherent meaning-
effect.110 My story of Gilad was intended to actualize this claim. This would be true for all narrative 
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but it is especially true for the biblical narrative given the life-giving work of the Spirit. When the 
Word speaks, meaning happens.  
In their caring, story-tellers engage others; their purpose is to invite their readers/hearers 
into another world where they may experience their own lives in concert and/or in contrast to 
another’s. A story told is a story shared; it is a with experience—a doorway into meaningful 
relationship.   
The Storyteller is Reliable. 
“To you it is given to know the mysteries of the kingdom…” (Luke 8:10).  God’s narrative 
revelation of truth is reliably mediated by the full range of literary tropes and genres as noted 
above, but the most widely referenced (properly or not) is that of proposition. J. P Moreland defines 
a proposition minimally as “the content of declarative sentences/statements and thoughts/beliefs 
that is true or false.”111 Newsome identifies it as a separate thought, that is, a statement that is not 
dependent on the one who says it for truth.112 One might simply consider it to be a declaration 
related to a claim of facticity. 
God’s offering insight into, or at the least, insight toward the securing presence of objective 
universals seems to me to be a gift of confidence, even if most may be tucked away in the 
unassailable mind of God. Who would abandon the comfort of reassuring claims such as “I AM 
that I AM.” (Exod 3:14), or “In the beginning, God…”? (Gen 1:1) Who would dismiss the 
reliability of Jesus, the absolute Rock upon which to build one’s life? (Luke 6:48).  Indeed, 
Wolterstorff’s notion of warranted beliefs makes sense to me, for it is self-evident that reasonable 
persons can and do find agreement on basic realities, often asserted propositionally. 113  
However, given what has been previously discussed it is clear that the conclusive 
apprehension of absolute truth is a fiction. Moreland grants the notion of “some indubitable 
beliefs” but quickly adds that “there are simply not enough of them to ground our entire noetic 
structure.”114 Brueggemann notes that the Old Testament offers what he terms as “cognitive 
constancies,” but in contrast to modernist urges toward closure he points out that these constancies 
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become highly provisional when Israel’s God-speech is taken as a whole.115 One may stand upon 
a firm foundation but the nature of one’s access to that foundation must be carefully considered. 
Knowing needs to be tempered by an awareness that one’s comprehension of a fact operates within 
the dynamics of the world in front of the text.  
 
Excursus: Propositionalism. 
Against these observations, large populations in the Church anchor themselves with 
indubitable, warranted, or absolute truth claims by unwittingly or otherwise investing faith in the 
primacy of Propositionalism—a linguistic approach to truth that is grounded in modernist themes 
of correspondence theories as noted below. In so doing, they discount the reliable contribution of 
less precise genres, e.g. metaphor, irony, et al by marginalizing them as dangerously unstable, 
subjective, or even subversive of the quest for absolute truth.116  
Malina helpfully probes the propositionalist approach to truth by studying forms of reading. 
He describes a propositionalist model as a grammatically regulated chain of propositions that 
correspond to words with pre-intended meanings. For the reader, knowledge begins as these words 
describe a presumed separate reality. Truth emerges according to a proper correspondence between 
the reader’s propositional description and that reality.117 Lakoff and Johnson would place Malina’s 
model squarely within an objectivist account of truth which likewise presumes the world to be 
comprised of separate objects with which language must correspond.118 Thus, words mean to the 
extent they properly identify inherent realities; truth exists as disembodied from persons and is 
objectively attainable through the scientific method. 119    
Importantly, the correspondence model of truth is characteristic of Biblicism’s reading of 
the scriptures. The Chicago Statement on Biblical Hermeneutics declares: “We affirm that that the 
Bible expresses God’s truth in propositional statements (emphasis mine), and we declare that 
biblical truth is both objective and absolute.”120 J. P. Moreland adds that which is true is “not a 
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piece of language, but a proposition.” 121 Hence, the clarity of proposition is given far more 
currency than other genres.122  
Vanhoozer calls the Biblicist view, “propositionalist theology” which he states, “tends to 
see Scripture in terms of revelation, revelation in terms of conveying information…language is 
concerned with stating truth…meaning is largely a matter of ostensive reference.”123 I cannot help 
but note the irony of Biblicism’s standpoint as being subsumed by the metaphorical presupposition 
of TRUTH AS OBJECT. 124 
Of course, the is of TRUTH AS OBJECT can be found in biblical texts, e.g. 1 John 1:8, Ps 
119:43, Gen 42:16, and I find these references to be comforting. But one must reconsider the 
primacy of proposition, i.e. propositionalism, for it refuses to consider the is not pole of the truth 
metaphor discussed above. Vern Poythress, a member of the committee which issued the Chicago 
Statement above, informs me that the zealous tone of the Statement had reactionary roots on 
account of linguistic turns which emerged from a hint of flexibility evident in the earlier 1978 
Chicago Statement on Inerrancy.125 One suspects the ICBI had found it necessary to hold things 
together by putting ambiguity to bed in favor of certitude. To me this carries the scent of 
Brueggemann’s observation that reductionism has a teleological commitment to closure, one 
perhaps historically driven to legitimate religious authority.126 This is consistent with the self-
evident reality that describing an idea as a fact closes discussion.  
One wonders if these communities, by choosing certitude over ambiguity, deny themselves 
the fuller face of God. Indeed, such reactions are not without consequences; the trajectories into 
Christian belief and praxis lay beyond the scale of this essay. But I point the interested reader to 
Babinski’s case studies of persons who have abandoned propositionalist communities because of 
a God who wore the mask of Propositionalism’s most unflattering qualities.127  
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The World Behind the Text: Words with a Past. 
Ricouer’s third world, his world behind the text is a wide landscape. In the field of theology, 
it has been the realm of historical criticism which has led to something of an excavation of 
historicity, particularly in efforts to discover a verifiable Jesus. 128 It has also been of great interest 
to Biblicists, in large part as a means to discover authorial intention, or better still, a way to unearth 
those elusive canonical autographs.  
But these two quests barely wipe the dust from times past. The world behind the text offers 
more to consider. For one, it contains a constellation of cultural assumptions that shaped persons’ 
encounters with the Word. As examples, the Galatians understood Paul’s praise of their courageous 
welcome of him in his sickness because the experience of their world—unlike current 
experience—should have bound them in fear of their context such as the presumed power of the 
Evil Eye. (Gal 4:14). 129 And what did it mean to the women at the empty tomb to learn that they—
as women—were blessed as the first witnesses to the risen Christ? (Mark 16). Historically 
informed, today’s reader can glean meaning for her own experience by finding how and how not 
her own story resonates with times past.   
Then, too, is the use of words behind the text. This is particularly important in regard to 
metaphor.130 For example, to Jesus’s followers the Cross was not the same metaphoric concept on 
Good Friday as it was post-Easter; CROSS AS CURSE became CROSS AS BLESSING. It was 
in the becoming of the new metaphor that understanding emerged in ways particular to their time. 
And what of other post-Easter metaphors such as CHRIST AS KING, or GENTILES AS ISRAEL 
…did not their meanings become what they had not been? One might learn much by working into 
the metaphors of her own faith historically in order to discover in hindsight what her spiritual 
forbears had discovered while advancing.  
It is also important to take account for the fact that what is today’s world behind the text 
was not the same world for the early Church. The supervision of the Holy Spirit notwithstanding, 
the New Testament writers—who are seen today as in the world behind the text—actually wrote 
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in front of the text, as it were, and with all the assumptions that location suggests. Further, from 
their vantage the world behind their texts looked different to them than that same world looks 
today; they interpreted it in light of their own world, one much different than that of the modern 
reader. Therefore, one might ask whether and/or why Peter invested something new into the Isaiah 
of old. (I Pet 3:24; Isa 53:5). Or how is it that Paul added to Jesus’s words on divorce? (1 Cor 7).  
And so the world behind the text is rich with opportunity but it is not without limitations. 
Brueggemann bluntly notes that this world behind the text, is simply not available.131 Emerging 
scholarship recognizes that, at the least, it cannot be a sufficient source of meaning because 
interpretation happens in front of the text. So, for example, retrieving authorial intention is as Hart 
remarks, “a lost cause.”132  
Ricoeur, too, is very explicit: “Having been poses a problem…The pastness of an 
observation in the past is not observable but memorable.”133 This leads him to assert that 
discovering (history) and inventing (remembering) are indistinguishable, necessarily creating a 
fictive world behind the text.134 He goes on to claim that “the world behind is re-configured 
through a confrontation with the world in front of the text.”135    
This leads to the notion of witness. That which cannot be observed can still be held as true 
on the basis of reliable testimony. This happens daily in courts of law. But how much more 
significant is the canonical witness? Brueggemann helpfully refers to the “dramatic courtroom” of 
Israel’s experience which “proceeds with a recognition that ‘what is’ (reality) effectively derives 
from ‘what is said’ (testimony.)”136  “You are my witnesses, says the Lord…” (Isa 43) is no small 
statement. Accordingly, it is reasonable to authenticate the sacrificial testimony of many of Jesus’s 
first followers; the Church has tested their claims through time and found them to be credible.  
So I contend that history—however imperfectly re-configured—still provides valuable 
insight into warranted beliefs. I have not met Jesus in the flesh and I am quite sure that his personal 
history has been fictionalized to a point. Yet I remain confident of certain basic events and 
teachings that I accept as reliable. Further, I believe one can know something of an author’s 
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intention and learn from it. The tone and declarations of 1 Corinthians leave me quite confident 
that Paul was unhappy with the behavior of that community; I have little doubt that James intended 
to encourage more ethical praxis among believers.  
Important questions remain, of course: To what extent and on what basis is the world 
behind the text helpful? How does one enter this world? Here Wright intervenes with his proposal 
of critical realism, an approach to knowing that acknowledges the reality of the thing known as 
something other than the knower while still recognizing limitations of access to that reality.137 
Thus, some level of objective reality can be reasonably ascertained from historical context and 
may be helpful if critically managed.   
Despite the presence of some fog, this world behind the text is still inhabited by God; he 
has invested inspired testimony with the currency of his grace. He has pronounced value in time, 
place and experience. Yet language reveals the limitations of this world and in so doing, reveals a 
God who is also willing to forego the precise memory of or slavish attachment to things behind 
words.  Instead, he is shown to be a God who permits and even invites a humble exploration into 
the relevance of textual background without demanding subservience to its elusive and sometimes 
presumed expectations. 
Concluding Thoughts.  
“Oh that my people would listen to me, that Israel would walk in my ways!” (Ps 81:13.) 
Knowing better how language works may, indeed, make a valuable contribution to one’s knowing 
of God. But better knowing language—like better knowing God—should ultimately matter in the 
lives of persons and church communities. So I cannot conclude this discussion without asking in 
what ways a fuller appreciation of language might make a difference—what might the effect of 
words be once the whole of language is apprehended? 
I believe that answers are implicit in every category discussed above—that every feature 
of language has efficacious potential and their range of applications are limited only by the 
imagination. But the question begs a more concrete answer so with space constraints in view I 
offer two examples. First, I will present metaphor as a potential site of Christian unity—a goal 
urged by the Spirit, e.g. Romans 15, Ephesians 4, and Colossians 3. Second, I will consider the 
dynamic relationship between dialogism and praxis as they conflate to become performance, i.e., 
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the outworking of truth in the life of the Church as commanded throughout the scriptures e.g. Rom 
12, James 2, and Gal 5.  
 
Metaphor…Unity in Diversity. 
“For as the body is one and has many members, but all the members of that one body, being 
many, are one body, so also is Christ.” (Eph 4:12.) It would be good for emerging scholarship to 
widen the doors of Heidegger’s house of being so that language may be more clearly seen as a 
safe-house within which the Church may conduct profitable discourse.138 And metaphor may be 
the singularly most important room, for no other linguistic element has more power to unify.139 
In the essay above I discussed the might of metaphor as found in its holding of two 
opposing poles in tension for the purpose of expanding meaning. In so doing, living metaphors are 
forms of tensive language that require their poles to be neither literalized into absurdity nor 
banalized into meaninglessness. If either pole is destroyed, the metaphor dies.  
Unfortunately, the corpses of metaphors lay heaped along the fault lines of many issues 
dividing the Church. One needs only consider concepts like inspiration, revelation, atonement, and 
baptism, etc. I contend that factions (communities that have stopped listening) remain so because 
they have eliminated one pole from view, thus killing metaphors by turning them into either 
abstractions or homonyms. As an abstraction the once metaphor, e.g. inspiration, is given a 
singular meaning with various uses; as a homonym it is fractured to a number of separate 
meanings.140 In either case, the word is stripped of its tensive potential and enlisted into service as 
a referential truth object. In consequence, one is left surveying a linguistic killing field that has 
virtually eliminated potential loci of discourse.   
This is a great loss. Metaphor points to a God who seeks for the Church what metaphor is: 
a unity of diversity. The grand opportunity for the Church then, may be found in the resuscitation 
of metaphor, i.e., the (re)erecting of two poles at the many points of divergence. The Church could 
begin by recognizing her own metaphoric identity of CHURCH AS ONE BODY; she should 
understand herself as being in the tensions she sustains. Comprehending her identity in this way 
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could challenge the divisive resistance arising out of fears of ECUMENISM AS COMPROMISE 
because the very nature of metaphor requires the ongoing engagement of opposing poles.  
Of course, questions remain as to how one might encourage diverse groups to risk such 
discourse—resurrecting metaphor is discomforting for it means abandoning certitude. Yet some 
toes are in the water. Colin Gunton offers the intriguing potential of a re-evaluation of the 
atonement in terms of metaphor, and Poythress acknowledges metaphor’s role in his own 
willingness to look at things anew.141  
Strangely, Biblicism may prove to be a premier site for metaphor to strut its stuff.  For 
example, Biblicism has historically relied on a non-metaphoric understanding of inspiration, 
presupposing it to be a homonym. As such, it considers inspiration to represent a variety of closed 
definitions from which its adherents have chosen one, i.e. plenary inerrancy. However, as linguistic 
turns gain voices at Biblicist tables the concept of inspiration may be given back its metaphoric 
life. In so doing, its meaning would be expanded with a host of possibilities and the unifying 
implications are significant. Perhaps this is one of the reasons that evangelical David Williams 
recently wrote that metaphor offers the potential to “transform the life of the Church.”142  
  
Performance...Listening Differently.  
“So shall my word go out of my mouth and it shall not return void but it shall do that which 
I please, and it shall accomplish that for which I send it.” (Isa 55:11).  From the first word God 
wants to matter by doing, and the locution of God does, in fact, actualize behavior. Likewise, as 
has been contended above, language theory reveals that to language is necessarily to do.  
This matters a great deal for the life of the Church. If she would more fully appreciate the 
linguistic relationship between what she hears and how she acts she might begin to listen, 
differently.  One can only imagine the consequences of the Church piqued with fresh intention to 
the God-speech of the Sermon.   
Actually, I think it is fair to ask whether very many issues matter more to a church 
community (or to an individual) than their willingness to listen. This is especially pertinent to this 
discussion since the relationship between speech and performance spotlights the discursive 
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relationship between God and his people. This is a God who longs to converse with his own—to 
have his people speak and listen—and in so doing, to live truth. The performance nature of 
language demonstrates a God who wants to live his Story with his Church; WORDS AS DRAMA 
reveals a God who kindly speaks/writes his love Narrative from behind, within, and in front of his 
stage to a Church who is invited to hear/read it and make it her own.143 This yearning mutuality—
this gift of grace—at the very least ought to inspire the humility for one to listen respectfully to 
the Word. “He that has ears, let him hear.” (Matt 11:15). 
That said, for those willing to listen, difficult and important questions regarding the broader 
relationship between God-speech and performance would prove fruitful to explore. For example, 
if performance is an interpretative act what are its heuristic criteria? To what extent is performance 
discourse-dependent? What of the inverse---does not how one behaves actually say something? 
How does one avoid Larsen’s objection that performance too easily becomes self-contained within 
its own purposes?144 And how is the relationship between conversation and praxis actually 
mediated? To this Treier offers the discomforting observation that controls are often set by the 
closing-off of questions.145 This is unfortunate. It just may be that proper mediation is best 
observed within asking-listening church communities with emerging linguistic theory in view.146 
(For them, Wright’s critical realism with its patient listening could prove to be especially 
helpful.)147  
It is these kinds of questions that are important for the listening Church to consider. The 
discussions they prompt have the potential to help her identify to what/whom she is listening and/or 
what she is saying.  And as the Church assesses these things she might want to remember Ricoeur’s 
observation that it is in her conversations that her truth happens.148 This would be why her present 
happenings of truth (performances) are what they are—for good or otherwise. 
Finally, as an important aside, the Drama has still more to reveal about God’s love. He 
seeks (and wants his Church to seek) discourse with the audience.  As Fowl and Jones write, 
Christians wishing to read (hence to perform) in communion must learn to engage and to listen to 
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the voices of outsiders.149  The listening Church will be changed and even blessed by the 
perlocutive speech of the audience. And the audience will be likewise blessed because God’s 
words do not return void; God-speech does not work that way. Indeed, under the Spirit’s guidance 
so-called outsiders will leave their seats and assume their roles in the Drama because the Word so 
loves the world that he speaks with it. One can hardly imagine how language might matter more.  
⁕ 
In the preceding essay I have contended that language, ontologically considered, is 
revelatory of the nature of God. To that end I have surveyed various ways in which it functions so 
that a deeper understanding of its nature might serve Hart’s compelling summons to know God 
better. I attempted a story of my own to emphasize the particular power of narrative in establishing 
an interpretive context. I went on to use Ricoeur’s worlds of words as categories with which to 
organize a presentation of language’s revelatory functions. I also contended that Ricoeur’s models 
are enveloped by the unifying presence of the Spirit so that meaning might emerge in the lives of 
persons out of the dynamic function of the interplay of his worlds.  
My hope in all of this is has been “that I may know him and the power of his resurrection.” 
(Phil 3:10).  It would please me greatly if I have succeeded in some small way in encountering 
who God is through my brief exploration into what language does. 
Personal Reflections.   
“Who do you say that I am?” (Luke 9:20) 
 
I stand atop St. Andrews’ cliffs 
And converse with the sea. 
By water and stone, 
By seabirds and foam 
I listen. 
By moon or by day, 
By silver or grey 
I imagine. 
I close my eyes and breathe deeply 
And know that I have encountered God. 
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For most of my life the scriptures have been Word-made-flesh-made-propositions.” 
Therefore, the sudden recognition of these texts as living families of words has been liberating, 
particularly as new friendships with new literary forms have allowed me to unseat proposition 
from its lofty chair.   
Of particular effect has been the realization of Biblicism’s heavy investment in the world 
in the text. By definition, plenary inspiration locates the power of language inside of inspired 
words. Recognizing the insufficiency of this emphasis has proven to be pivotal in my spiritual 
journey. The exploration into the wider world of language has re-located power, placing it in the 
living Word whose Spirit uses words as creative, organic agents of grace.  
I do not pretend to know all the many trajectories that might occur within other persons or 
in communities whose image of the Word shifts. But surely, the way one knows God will affect 
how one acts, with whom one communes, and even what one dares to dream. It has already done 
so with me. Brueggemann’s work on Israel’s discourse with God has been a particularly helpful 
contribution to my stated thesis but, more importantly, has provided firm footing for my own leap 
off the cliffs. He effectively points to the many passages in the Old Testament (e.g. Job, Ezekiel 
16, 20, 23, Jeremiah 20, Psalms 35, 88, Hosea 2) where Yahweh is found committed to negotiating, 
surprising, promising, confounding, instructing, confusing, explaining, baffling, and relentlessly 
engaging his people by way of the flexible, imaginative, ambiguous, propositional, paradoxical, 
descriptive, irrational, and relational qualities of…language.150  
If I am to be honest, this journey has led me to encounter he whom I had hoped for but 
dared not expect. Until now, I have lived my Christian life in search of bedrock beneath the sacred 
texts. But language urged me to drill more deeply and in so doing I have been startled to discover 
the Word to be more a well than a quarry. “The voice of Jehovah is upon the waters.” (Ps 29:7). 
Language has shown God to be more sea than rock, and the difference matters a great deal. The 
God I had once thought as fixed and cold now opens his arms wide like the blue horizon; he moves 
with me, he listens. This God I wish to know better and I thank the Spirit who has directed my 
journey to this place through the worlds of language.  
I am aware of the scholarship yet needed on my topic and am happy to see movement 
within the academy. Trevor Hart and Bruce Longenecker invested a great deal of interest in this 
 
150 Brueggemann, Theology, See generally, but particularly 359 ff. 
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subject, greatly encouraging me. Vern Poythress happily surprised me with his candid enthusiasm 
over the implications of language theory for theology; Brueggemann has no doubt that Bakhtin’s 
work will be crucial for future work;151 Vanhoozer looks forward to fresh approaches for theology 
according to the significance of Scripture’s literary forms.152   
This all seems good to me, for I believe language to be a gift of the Word, the doorway to 
relationship and a window to God. Its diversity is its strength, giving it broad shoulders to carry 
the Good News where the Spirit wills. May the Spirit illumine language yet more as a means to 
know God better so that the body of Christ might walk as one with Jesus on the sea. 
  
 
151 Ibid. 83, note 57. 
152 Vanhoozer, “Lost in Interpretation,” in Whatever Happened, ed. Kostenberger, p.108. 
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